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0.  Introduction 
This paper is concerned with the non-standard syntactic construction instantiated 
by the utterances in (1) through (5). I have collected 230 such utterances, of which 
half were casually observed across a variety of different speech events and half 
were gathered from the Switchboard Corpus (SWB) of phone conversations 
(Godfrey et al. 1992).
1
(1)  Well that’s the reason why I like both of those programs is because they’re 
kind of based on books. (SWB) 
(2)  That’s my dream I guess is to have my own darkroom. (SWB) 
(3)  And that’s my big area of interest in linguistics is discourse. 
(4)  That’s what I was about to say is that everyone needs to be tested. (SWB) 
(5)  That’s what I’m trying to do is go back to blonde. 
The non-standard character of these sentences stems from the fact that the speaker 
seems to change syntactic direction halfway through the utterance. As a 
consequence, each of the sentences contains a constituent that is simultaneously 
part of two sentential structures. In (3), for instance, the NP my big area of 
interest in linguistics relates both to the preceding that’s to yield a complete 
sentence, as well as to the following is discourse, which renders another complete 
sentence. With traditional rhetoric, such structures can be categorized as apo 
koinou constructions. 
 Instead of characterizing these utterances as the result of a speaker’s mid-
sentence change of mind, however, I do not regard them as performance errors. 
Rather, I view them as instantiations of a syntactic construction in its own right, 
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which I call the that’s X is Y construction. The construction label is derived from 
actual utterance tokens as follows. 
(6)  And that’sbe-1 [my big area of interest in linguistics]X isbe-2 [discourse]Y.
(7)  That’sbe-1 [what I’m trying to do]X isbe-2 [go back to blonde]Y.
This construction has been noted in the literature, if only in passing, as a 
phenomenon of some sort related to the primary point of interest of a given work. 
Examples can be found in work on the presentational amalgam construction 
(Lambrecht 1988:337), the double be construction (McConvell 1988:302, Tuggy 
1996:733, Massam 1999:345), and in studies of wh-cleft and reverse wh-cleft 
constructions (Hopper 2000:8, Oberlander and Delin 1996:193). Beyond such 
occasional mentions, the that’s X is Y construction has until now not received a 
detailed analysis. 
 The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 1 contains a brief overview 
of how the X- and Y-slots of the construction are syntactically realized. In 
addition, it is shown that neither the initial demonstrative, nor the forms of the 
two copulas are completely lexically specified as the construction label might 
suggest. In Section 2, an analysis of the that’s X is Y construction in terms of an 
amalgam of two independently existing construction types of English is 
presented. Section 3 describes the more salient discourse functions of the 
construction. 
1.  Syntactic realizations of the X- and Y-slots 
The X-slot of the that’s X is Y construction is instantiated in one of two ways: 
either as an NP or as a headless relative clause (RC). In more than half of the 
example tokens, X takes the form of an NP. This NP is either headed lexically as 
in (1), (2) and (3), or headed by a quantifier followed by an of-PP as in (8). In the 
other examples, the X-slot is filled with a headless RC that contains either a wh-
relative pronoun as in (4) and (5), or the quantifier all as in (9). This explains why 
the construction was noticed previously in works on (reverse) wh-clefts. 
(8)  That’s one of the symptoms of sunstroke is you stop sweating. 
(9)  And in Arizona that’s all they have too is man-made lakes. (SWB) 
 The range of syntactic categories instantiating the Y-slot is somewhat more 
diverse. In a little over two fifths of the examples, Y takes the form of a finite 
clause (see (4) and (8)), including subordinate clauses (see (1)). This finite 
structure can itself be complex, as can be seen in (34) below. 
(10) That’s about the most unglamorous job you can have is being a student DJ 
at a local radio station. 
(11) That’s where I started looking is on the 2006 World Cup website. 
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Realizations of the Y-slot as NPs are shown in (3) and (9); they make up about a 
quarter of the example tokens. In another quarter, Y takes the form of a non-finite 
clause, headed either by an infinitive (see (2) and (5)), or by a gerund as in (10). 
In relatively few cases, a PP occurs in the Y-slot as in (11). Occasionally, other 
elements such as numerals or adverbs fill this slot. The distributional patterns are 
summarized in Table 1. 
 NP RC Total 
 N % N % N %
Finite clause 67 29.1 30 13.1 97 42.2
Non-finite clause 34 14.8 24 10.4 58 25.2
NP 26 11.3 35 15.2 61 26.5
PP 2 0.9 9 3.9 11 4.8
Other 1 0.4 2 0.9 3 1.3
Total 130 56.5 100 43.5 230 100.0
Table 1: Syntactic realizations of the X-slot (columns) and Y-slot (rows).
 The present study is limited to tokens of the that’s X is Y construction that 
begin with initial that’s or that is. In the vast majority of examples (N = 207; 
90.0%), be-2 agrees with the present tense form of be-1. Only in a few instances 
(N = 21; 9.1%) do the two copulas not agree in tense, with be-2 occurring in the 
past tense form was, as shown in (12). In all such cases, the X-slot is realized 
either as a headless RC with a verb in the past tense or as an NP containing an RC 
in which the verb is in the past tense. In two examples (0.9%), the two copulas do 
not agree in number (is – are). 
(12) That’s what I noticed when I was there was the ice storms you got around 
February. (SWB) 
(13) I think that must be the worst job in the world is being a vet. 
While that’s is clearly the most frequent initial element, it is not a fixed part of the 
construction either. The non-contracted variant that is is attested, and so are other 
forms of be-1, including its combination with modal verbs as in (13). 
Furthermore, the initial demonstrative may be this instead of that. A maximally 
abstract construction label would thus be DEM BE-1 X BE-2 Y. However, the one 
used here represents the most frequent realizations of the demonstrative and 
copula positions of the construction. 
2.  That’s X is Y as an information-structure amalgam 
As was already mentioned, I consider the that’s X is Y construction a fully 
conventionalized sentence pattern, not the result of performance errors. While it is 
a syntactic construction in its own right, it is at the same time related to other 
independently existing constructions of English. This view is consistent with a 
Construction Grammar approach to linguistic organization (see, e.g., Fillmore and 
Kay 1993, Lambrecht 1994, Goldberg 1995, among others), in which grammar 
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consists of a structured inventory of constructions. One way to motivate the form 
and function of a given construction is to relate it to other constructions that need 
to be posited in the grammar for independent reasons. In the case of the that’s X is 
Y construction, two independently existing construction types come together in an 
unusual way to give rise to a constructional amalgam. 
 Let me introduce the two components of the that’s X is Y construction. 
Throughout this section, the attested that’s X is Y tokens in (3) and (5) will serve 
as paradigm examples. From these can be derived the two sentences in (14) and 
(15). These sentences have a non-predicating semantic structure, that is, rather 
than predicating a property of a topic referent, they are used either to establish an 
identity relation between two referents, the identified and the identifier (see (14)), 
or to specify a value for a given variable (see (15)). Small capitals indicate the 
locations of the main sentence accents, which fall here on the sentence-final focus 
phrases expressing the identifier/value. 
(14) My big area of interest in linguistics is DISCOURSE.
(15) What I’m trying to do is go back to BLONDE.
A well-known property of such sentences is their reversibility, that is, the 
constituents containing the identified/variable and the identifier/value can be 
inverted, so that the focal identifier/value constituents occur sentence-initially: 
(16) DISCOURSE is my big area of interest in linguistics. 
(17) Go back to BLONDE is what I’m trying to do. 
In parallel to the established terms wh-cleft and reverse wh-cleft constructions for 
(15) and (17), respectively, I will categorize sentences like (14) as equative and 
those like (16) as reverse equative constructions. The reverse constructions are 
frequently used with the demonstrative that as initial constituent: 
(18) THAT’s my big area of interest in linguistics. 
(19) THAT’s what I’m trying to do. 
What wh-cleft and equative constructions have in common is their identificational 
function. 
 Thus, two types of identificational constructions, the reverse and the non-
reverse type, provide the two amalgam components for the that’s X is Y
construction. And it is from these components that the construction inherits 
certain formal and functional properties, which therefore do not need to be 
stipulated for the amalgam. The that’s X is Y construction inherits the non-
predicating semantics of its components, the sentence-initial focus phrase in the 
form of the demonstrative pronoun that, and the sentence-final focus phrase in a 
variety of forms. Moreover, it inherits the topical constituent in the X-slot, either 
in the form of an NP or a headless RC. But it also displays idiosyncratic 
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properties, in particular, the presence of two focus phrases and its referent-
specifying discourse function. While the amalgam is related to its components, it 
is not reducible to them. Its syntactic form can be motivated by appealing to its 
pragmatic, that is, information-structural properties, as well as to those of its 
component constructions. We are dealing here, then, with an information-
structure amalgam (see also Lambrecht 1988). This analysis is spelled out in more 
detail in the remainder of this section. 
 Those tokens of the that’s X is Y construction in which the X-slot is realized 
as a headless RC are analyzed as amalgams of the wh-cleft and the reverse wh-
cleft constructions. I will take as uncontroversial the observation that cleft 
constructions (see, e.g., Prince 1978, Lambrecht 2001) express the same logical 
proposition as their corresponding canonical sentences, but impose a pragmatic 
structuring on that proposition in terms of a “backgrounded” or presupposed and 
“foregrounded” or focused part. To characterize the that’s X is Y construction and 
its components more precisely, I will adopt the information-structure framework 
developed in Lambrecht (1994), and elaborated, inter alia, in Lambrecht and 
Michaelis (1998) and Lambrecht (2001). I will introduce the relevant information-
structural categories as we proceed. 
 Consider again sentence (15). By employing this wh-cleft, the speaker lends 
expression to her assumption that, at the time of utterance, “the hearer already 
knows or believes or is ready to take for granted” (Lambrecht 2001:474) that she 
is trying to do something. The open proposition ‘speaker is trying to do x’ is 
pragmatically presupposed or “old information”, coded by the headless RC what 
I’m trying to do. At the same time, the speaker asserts that the intended activity 
consists in changing her hair color back to blonde. The pragmatic assertion or 
“new information” conveyed by using the given wh-cleft consists in the specifi-
cation of a value for the variable in the presupposed open proposition. It is this 
identity relation between variable and value that “the speaker expects the hearer to 
know or believe or take for granted as a result of hearing the utterance” 
(Lambrecht 2001:474). The assertion is achieved by substituting the focus deno-
tatum ‘go back to blonde’ for the variable in the open proposition, where focus is 
defined as “that component of a pragmatically structured proposition whereby the 
assertion differs from the presupposition” (Lambrecht 2001:474). The presence of 
the focus denotatum makes the utterance into a pragmatic assertion, that is, makes 
it possible for the sentence to convey a piece of new information to the hearer. 
 As argued in Lambrecht (2001), the felicitous use of wh-clefts requires the 
speaker to make further assumptions about the hearer’s state of mind. The kind of 
pragmatic presupposition introduced in the preceding paragraph pertains to the 
assumed knowledge state of the hearer at the time of utterance. It is referred to as 
knowledge or K-presupposition. Thus, the open proposition ‘speaker is trying to 
do x’ is K-presupposed. In the adopted framework, to know a proposition means 
to have a mental representation of its denotatum, not to know its truth or 
falsehood. In addition, the adequate use of (15) requires that the state of affairs 
expressed by the K-presupposed proposition is also assumed by the speaker to be 
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“of present concern in the discourse, so that her assertion can be interpreted as 
expressing relevant information with respect to this state of affairs” (Lambrecht 
2001:476; emphasis in the original). Such speaker assumptions regarding the 
status of denotata as centers of current interest in the discourse at utterance time 
are called topicality or T-presupposition. The information structure of sentence 
(15) can now be represented as follows.
2
(20) K-Presupposition: ‘speaker is trying to do x’ 
  T-Presupposition: the K-presupposition is of current interest 
  Focus:   ‘go back to blonde’ 
  Assertion:  x = ‘go back to blonde’ 
 Turning to reverse wh-clefts, it is well-known that they tend to occur in 
spoken discourse with a demonstrative pronoun as focus phrase, most frequently 
that, less often this (see, e.g., Collins 1991, Oberlander and Delin 1996, among 
others). It is this type of reverse wh-cleft that serves as a component of the that’s 
X is Y amalgam. The information structure of reverse wh-clefts parallels the one 
of wh-clefts; the analysis of sentence (19) is given in (21). 
(21) K-Presupposition: ‘speaker is trying to do x’ 
  T-Presupposition: the K-presupposition is of current interest 
Focus:   ‘that’ 
Assertion:  x = ‘that’   
 Now, sentence (5), repeated here as (22), is an amalgam based on the wh-cleft 
in (15) and the reverse wh-cleft in (19). Its information-structure analysis is given 
in (23). 
(22) [THAT]’s (what I’m trying to do) is [go back to BLONDE].
(23) K-Presupposition: ‘speaker is trying to do x’ 
  T-Presupposition: the K-presupposition is of current interest 
Focus 1:  ‘that’ 
Assertion 1:  x = ‘that’   
Focus 2:  ‘go back to blonde’ 
Assertion 2:  x = ‘go back to blonde’ 
Notice that (22) has two focus phrases, that is, it expresses two assertions. (Focus 
phrases are indicated by square brackets, topical constituents are marked by 
parentheses.) Moreover, the construction has a referent-specifying discourse 
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function (see Section 3). The initial demonstrative pronoun always refers back to 
a referent already established in the prior discourse, but this antecedent tends 
strongly to remain referentially vague. The second focus denotatum is referen-
tially more specific and resolves this vagueness. It is the second assertion that 
carries the communicatively most important new information by rendering the 
anaphorically vague referent more specific.  
That’s X is Y tokens in which the X-slot is realized as an NP are analyzed as 
amalgams of the equative and reverse equative constructions. It is important to 
note that in equative constructions such as (14), no K-presupposition in the form 
of an open proposition is attached to the subject NP. However, by uttering the 
sentence in (14), the speaker assumes the denotatum of my big area of interest in 
linguistics to be a center of current interest, that is, to be T-presupposed. This 
referent serves as the topic of the sentence, and the remainder of the sentence 
supplies relevant information with respect to it.
3
 Recall that equative construc-
tions do not predicate a property of a topic referent, but identify that referent with 
the focus referent coded in the complement of the copula. The information-
structure analysis of (14) is as follows. 
(24) T-Presupposition: ‘my big area ... in linguistics’ is topic for focus x 
  Focus:   ‘discourse’ 
  Assertion:  x = ‘discourse’ 
 Reverse equative constructions require a slightly different information-
structure analysis. As in the case of reverse wh-clefts, it involves a K-presupposed 
open proposition. This presupposed open proposition is syntactically marked by 
the inversion structure of the sentence with its sentence-initial focus phrase. Thus, 
in uttering sentence (18), the speaker gives expression to her assumption that the 
hearer already knows that she has a big area of interest in linguistics. Moreover, 
she also assumes that the denotatum of this proposition is of current concern, that 
is, T-presupposed. The referent of that is the focus denotatum, and it is its 
substitution for the variable in the open proposition that constitutes the pragmatic 
assertion. This is spelled out in (25). 
(25) K-Presupposition: ‘speaker’s big area of interest in linguistics is x’ 
  T-Presupposition: the K-presupposition is of current interest 
Focus:   ‘that’ 
Assertion:  x = ‘that’ 
 Now, sentence (3), repeated here as (26), is an amalgam based on the equative 
construction in (14) and the reverse equative construction in (18). As the 
information-structure analysis in (27) shows, the that’s X is Y construction here 
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inherits the presupposed open proposition from its reverse equative amalgam 
component. 
(26) [THAT]’s (my big area of interest in linguistics) is [DISCOURSE].
(27) K-Presupposition: ‘speaker’s big area of interest in linguistics is x’ 
  T-Presupposition: the K-presupposition is of current interest 
Focus 1:  ‘that’ 
Assertion 1:  x = ‘that’ 
Focus 2:   ‘discourse’ 
Assertion 2:  x = ‘discourse’ 
Adding the notation for information-structural properties to the construction label, 
we thus get: [that]’s (X) is [Y].
 The analysis presented so far contains one oversimplification: it has ignored 
the fact that the constituent in the X-slot usually contains one or more peaks of 
prosodic prominence, in addition to the focus accents on the initial demonstrative 
and the focus phrase in the Y-slot. Consider the more accurate renderings of 
examples (3) and (5) in (28) and (29), respectively. 
(28) [THAT]’s (MY big area of interest in linguistics) is [DISCOURSE].
(29) [THAT]’s (what I’m trying to DO) is [go back to BLONDE].
Despite the fact that the X-slot expresses a topical denotatum, which by definition 
is a relatively predictable element in a proposition, it is nevertheless accented. 
This is in contradiction to the widely-held belief that sentence accents signal “new 
information” (see, e.g., Selkirk 1984, among others). In the information-structure 
framework adopted here, however, sentence accentuation is not seen as 
exclusively marking foci or new information. Rather, the discourse function of 
sentence accents is to symbolize “an instruction from the speaker to the hearer to 
establish a pragmatic relation between a denotatum and a proposition” 
(Lambrecht and Michaelis 1998: 498). The pragmatic relation that is signaled by a 
sentence accent may be either a focus relation or a topic relation, so that we need 
to distinguish focus accents from topic accents. 
 Constituents with focal denotata, whose relation to the proposition is by 
definition unpredictable, must be accented.
4
 A topical constituent, on the other 
hand, is assigned an accent only if the topic relation between its denotatum and 
the proposition “has not yet been ratified at the level of the utterance” (Lambrecht 
and Michaelis 1998:499). A ratified, or established, topic denotatum is one whose 
presence in the proposition the speaker takes to be predictable for the hearer at 
utterance time to the point that it can be taken for granted. 
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 With the categories of topic accent and ratified topic in place, the earlier 
representations of the information structure of our paradigm sentences can be 
revised as follows. 
(30) Information structure of (5) (= (29); replaces (23)): 
  K-presupposition: ‘speaker is trying to do x’ 
  T-presupposition: the referent ‘speaker’ is ratified 
  Focus 1:  ‘that’ 
  Assertion 1:  x = ‘that’ 
  Focus 2:  ‘go back to blonde’ 
  Assertion 2:  x = ‘go back to blonde’ 
(31) Information structure of (3) (= (28); replaces (27)): 
  K-presupposition: ‘speaker’s big area of interest in linguistics is x’ 
  T-presupposition: ‘someone’s big ... in linguistics is x’ is ratified 
Focus 1:  ‘that’ 
Assertion 1:  x = ‘that’ 
Focus 2:   ‘discourse’ 
Assertion 2:  x = ‘discourse’ 
The accents on the constituents in the X-slots of that’s X is Y tokens do not mark 
foci. They are topic accents that are used by the speaker to ratify the current 
topics. While the open propositions coded in the X-slot are K-presupposed, their 
topical roles in the larger discourse context are not salient enough for them to be 
taken for granted on the level of the utterance, that is, they are not yet ratified. 
Such accents are thus topic ratification accents. They signal that portion of the K-
presupposition which is not contained within the T-presupposition (see Lambrecht 
and Michaelis 1998). Sentence (3) (= (28)), for instance, was uttered in an 
introductory class to linguistics, at a point when the different sub-disciplines of 
the field were introduced. For every sub-discipline (a list of which was projected 
onto a screen), the speaker had pointed out a fellow faculty member who 
specializes in that area. When turning to the field of discourse analysis, she 
uttered sentence (3). Thus, the fact that different linguists have different areas of 
specialization was already established as topical in the discourse. However, that 
the current topic at the level of the utterance would be the speaker’s field of 
interest still needed to be ratified, which was achieved by the topic accent on my.
3.  Discourse functions of that’s X is Y
This section describes the more salient discourse functions with which that’s X is 
Y tokens are used in context. As was mentioned above, the construction always 
has a referent-specifying function. The anaphoric referential vagueness of the 
initial demonstrative pronoun may manifest itself in a number of ways. For 
example, there may be more than one referent in the prior discourse that in 
principle can be construed as the antecedent of the demonstrative. In example 
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(32), that can be understood as referring to ‘semi-classical music’, ‘real classical 
music’ or ‘everyday type of ordinary music’. Which of these three speaker B has 
in mind is specified in the Y-slot.
5
(32) A: I like semi-classical. 
   ... The real classics I’m not ... as familiar with as, 
   you know, 
   the .. ordinary sounds that you hear every day .. [type of thing]. 
B:                                                                  [Uh-huh].  
   ... Yeah, 
   that’s about --
 That’s about all I listen to, 
   is the classical .. stuff. 
Referential vagueness may also obtain if a suitable antecedent for the demonstra-
tive has to be inferred from what was said in the prior discourse, or if an 
antecedent has to be construed from the composite content of an extended 
discourse stretch. The latter case is illustrated in (33). In the stretch of talk that 
has been omitted, speaker B dominates the conversation, talking about her 
cooking preferences. The cumulative content of her contribution constitutes the 
anaphoric referent of that.
(33) A: How about you, 
   what do you like to ... [to cook]?  
  B:                                     [Uh] we -- 
   It’s funny that, 
   .. um, 
   we’re talking about this. 
   (40 seconds omitted)
  B: That’s what I like to make, 
   is just real neat stuff like that,
   but. 
There are cases where it seems indeed possible to assign the initial demonstrative 
a non-vague anaphoric referent. In (34), for instance, that refers back to ‘they’re 
not gonna do it’. However, it remains the content of the Y-slot that elaborates, and 
hence specifies, this referent in accordance with the speaker’s communicative 
intentions. 
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(34) A: You know, 
   I- I- I have real strong beliefs in capital punishment, 
   but when it comes right down to it, 
   ... [yeah]. 
  B:     [They’re] not gonna do it. 
  A:  Uh yeah, 
   I- [I’m wondering though] --  
  B:     [That’s my biggest] problem is, 
   ... even if you give them the death penalty, 
   ... they appeal it, 
   and appeal it, 
   and appeal it.
 Furthermore, notice that the X-slot tends strongly to express the larger 
discourse theme or a particular aspect thereof. A very clear example of this is 
(33), where what I like to make almost literally echoes speaker A’s question What 
do you like to cook?, which defines the theme for the following stretch of 
discourse. These discourse themes are frequently of an evaluative nature and 
pertain to the interlocutors’ opinions and attitudes towards certain phenomena, 
including the conversational activity itself. In (32), the interlocutors discuss their 
music tastes, in (33) – their cooking preferences, and in (34) – their views on 
capital punishment. 
 Example (34) shows nicely another aspect of the discourse use of the that’s X 
is Y construction. Speakers often use it to state concisely a point to which they 
attach some importance in the discourse. Frequently, this concise mention is a 
more succinct rephrasing of a point that has already emerged in the preceding 
discourse. In (34), speaker B uses the that’s X is Y token to rephrase and thus state 
more clearly a point that she just made. It is known from the prior discourse that 
she is a strong supporter of capital punishment and in fact thinks that it is not 
applied strictly enough. So, one of the problems she has with the current system is 
that too often they’re not gonna do it. This view is a point of some importance to 
speaker B. Using the that’s X is Y construction, she rephrases it more concisely. 
 Lastly, in addition to the more thematically oriented functions reviewed so far, 
that’s X is Y tokens can also serve discourse-structuring functions. Example (33) 
is a case in point. Speaker B here ends her lengthy contribution by tying every-
thing she said in response to speaker A’s question back to the larger discourse 
theme and supplying a final succinct summary statement. As we see, different 
functions may simultaneously underlie the use of any one that’s X is Y token. 
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